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Abstract 
Guided by the theories of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism 
(Trivers, 1971), two studies tested hypotheses related to the notion that emotions are part 
of an evolved psychological system that functions, in part, to regulate social exchange. 
Emotional experience and exchange behaviors were predicted to vary based on both the 
structure of the situation and the type of relationship one has with a partner. Due to an 
absence of inclusive fitness effects, interaction with non-kin (compared with kin) 
exchange partners was expected to trigger more intense emotional responses. Study 1 
found that, as expected, unfair offers led to feelings of anger, but more so for non-kin 
partners compared to kin partners. Similarly, fair offers led to feelings of gratitude, but 
more so for non-kin partners. Study 2 used a 3 (emotion induction: anger, gratitude, 
control) by 4 (relationship partner: stranger, friend, cousin, sibling) by 2 (social dilemma 
task: take-some, give-some) experimental design and found evidence in support of the 
prediction that emotions are more likely to influence exchange behaviors with non-kin 
partners compared with kin partners. This research extends the social-functional approach 
to emotions into the context of evolutionary social psychological theory. 
 
Keywords: Evolutionary psychology, Emotion, Inclusive fitness, Reciprocal altruism  
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Inclusive Fitness, Reciprocal Altruism and Emotion: Testing a Social-Functional Model 
of Anger and Gratitude Across Kin and Non-Kin Relationships 
 Close relationships are defined by the causal interconnections between thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors between individuals across time (Kelley, et al., 1983; Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978). This interdependence leads to subjective experiences within relationship 
contexts that are based on a complex set of factors that include self-, partner-, and 
relationship-based influences. One way to organize and model interdependence processes 
is to examine the structure and function of social emotions. At a dyadic level of analysis, 
emotional expressions help to inform relationship partners of situation-relevant beliefs 
and intentions, which in turn leads to rapid coordination of social interaction. This 
coordination is often facilitated by the evocation of complementary and reciprocal 
emotions in others (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). As such, emotions act as powerful proximal 
motivators in social situations. When viewed from a social functional perspective, 
emotions provide insight into the means by which social bonds are forged, regulated, and 
maintained (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006). Within this 
framework, emotions like anger and gratitude are understood as part of information-
processing programs that potentiate thoughts and behaviors that helped solve adaptive 
problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors (Nesse, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; 
Tooby & Cosmides, 2008).  
 Guided by evolutionary theory, the current research tested the general notion that 
emotional experience varies based on both the structure of the situation and the type of 
relationship one has with a partner. Specifically, interaction with non-kin is predicted to 
be associated with a pattern of more intense emotional response compared to interaction 
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with kin in the presence of situational cues related to breaches of equity and reciprocity. 
Once triggered, these emotions are predicted to be more likely to influence exchange 
behaviors with non-kin partners compared to with kin partners. These predictions follow 
from the proposition that emotions are part of an evolved psychological system that 
regulates reciprocal altruism--a system that is not necessarily required to police exchange 
between kin (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971). 
Evolution and Social Psychology 
 Charles Darwin’s (1859) theory of evolution by natural selection is foundational 
for biologists, and is now beginning to guide the study of human behavior within the field 
of psychology. The goal of evolutionary psychology is to map a universal human nature 
by integrating psychology with principles from other fields such as biology, cognitive 
science, anthropology, and neuroscience (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). This process of 
consilience is a movement that has promise for bridging the gap between social science 
and the natural sciences by exploring the ultimate causes of human behavior using 
evolutionary theory.  
 There are three main components to the theory of natural selection: variation, 
inheritance, and selection (Darwin, 1859; Maynard Smith ,1958; Williams, 1966). 
Variation refers to differences in the attributes of individuals within a species (e.g., 
height, eye color, immune response, etc). Only the variable traits that are inherited (i.e., 
passed on reliably from parents to their offspring via genes) are subject to the 
evolutionary process. Selection refers to the differential reproductive success achieved by 
individuals because of the heritable variant traits that help with tasks associated with 
survival or reproduction. Over time, the traits of reproductively successful individuals 
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will occur with greater frequency in the population. The measure of an individual's direct 
reproductive success in passing on genes to offspring is referred to as classical fitness. 
 Although powerful and elegant, Darwin’s original theory was unable to account 
for some observed phenomena such as altruistic behavior among humans. How could 
natural selection have favored behavior that reduces personal fitness (i.e., survival and 
reproduction of offspring)? William Hamilton (1964) provided a theoretical contribution 
that was able to solve this putative paradox. Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory takes a 
“gene’s eye view” in that it conceptualizes fitness as the sum of an individual’s personal 
reproductive success (i.e., fitness in the classic Darwinian sense) plus the effects the 
individual’s actions have on the reproductive success of his or her genetic relatives. 
Using this enhanced evolutionary framework, Hamilton reasoned that altruism could 
have evolved if the fitness-related costs (c) to the altruist were smaller than the benefits 
(b) realized by the recipient, discounted by the degree of genetic relatedness between the 
two parties (r). He formalized this relationship into an inequality commonly referred to as 
Hamilton’s Rule: c < rb. Armed with this new idea, scientists were now able to include 
altruistic behavior under the umbrella of evolutionary theory. 
 Inclusive fitness theory has received considerable empirical support in non-human 
samples (Trivers, 1985), and has also more recently shown promise for explaining human 
social behaviors. The majority of this work has been guided by a set of theories derived 
from inclusive fitness theory by Robert Trivers: the theory of reciprocal altruism (1971), 
the theory of parental investment (1972), and the theory of parent-offspring conflict 
(1974). These theories share the common element of outlining zones of cooperation and 
conflict between individuals based on the variables from Hamilton's rule. 
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 The r from Hamilton's rule refers to the probability that two individuals share a 
particular allele based on common ancestry (Krebs, 1987; Mealey, 1985). An allele is one 
of two or more forms of a gene at a specific locus in a DNA sequence. The degree of 
relatedness is probabilistic and may vary between any two individuals, but has a reliable 
pattern within a population. Specifically, classes of kin have the following relatedness 
coefficients: siblings .50, parents with children .50, grandparents with grandchildren, .25, 
aunts/uncles with nieces/nephews .25, half siblings .25, first cousins .125, and second 
cousins .0625 (Buss, 2004).  
Inclusive Fitness and Human Behavior 
 Evidence from studies using a wide variety of samples and methods points to 
human behavior conforming to expectations derived from inclusive fitness theory. In one 
of the earliest of these studies, Essock-Vitale and McGuire (1985) examined helping 
behaviors using a sample of 300 white, middle class adult women aged 35 to 45 living in 
Los Angeles. Their structured interviews showed that major help was significantly more 
likely to come from kin than non-kin, and the help that came from kin was more likely to 
come from close kin (i.e., individuals with higher r). They also found that help was more 
likely to flow from individuals who are older and have more resources than in the 
opposite direction. These findings illustrate how the costs and benefits to individuals 
involved in helping behaviors vary in a manner consistent with the tenets of inclusive 
fitness theory.  
 Smith, Kish, and Crawford (1987) analyzed archival records of wills in British 
Columbia to test the hypothesis that people will give more of their wealth to close kin 
relative to distant kin. As predicted, this study found declining disbursement with 
5 
 
 
decreasing levels of genetic relatedness, with 46% of estates bequeathed to relatives 
sharing 50% of their genes, 8% bequeathed to relatives sharing 25% of their genes, and 
less than 1% bequeathed to relatives sharing 12.5% or less of their genes. A similar 
pattern of results have been found in a laboratory studying examining dispersal of 
imagined lottery winnings (Webster, 2003). 
 Burnstein, Crandall, and Kitayama (1994) conducted a series of studies using 
hypothetical scenarios that examined the extent to which decision rules for altruism 
conform to inclusive fitness theory. Participants were asked to report how likely they 
would be to help family members with various attributes (e.g., age, sex, health) after 
considering hypothetical scenarios of need (e.g., everyday helping, life-or-death 
situations). As expected, the authors found that participants were generally more likely to 
help kin as genetic relatedness increased. Interestingly, this result proved especially 
strong when comparing scenarios requiring help in a life-or-death situation versus help 
required in an everyday situation—but only for younger and healthier kin. Helping in the 
everyday scenario was not affected by age or health. This finding makes sense when 
viewed from an inclusive fitness theory perspective. In situations where a family 
member’s life is in danger, psychological mechanisms involved in the distribution of 
altruistic behavior should consider cues that approximate higher reproductive value 
because this is important information related to increasing inclusive fitness. 
 Inclusive fitness theory is not a psychological theory per se, but given the fact that 
it does help explain patterns of helping behaviors, there are likely to be a set of proximal 
psychological mechanisms through which inclusive fitness effects operate. At this point, 
there has unfortunately been very little research designed to examine the mediators of 
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genetic relatedness on helping decisions. One construct that has been investigated is 
emotional closeness (i.e., feelings of concern and caring). Korchmaros and Kenny (2001) 
asked participants to make hypothetical high risk life-or-death helping decisions for five 
or more family members and found that the relation between genetic relatedness and 
willingness to help decreased by 33% when emotional closeness was included in the 
model. A follow up study by Korchmaros and Kenny (2006) built on this finding and 
showed that the link between genetic relatedness and emotional closeness is mediated by 
propinquity (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950), perceived similarity (Byrne, 1961), 
and exposure and interaction (Saegert, Swap, & Zajonc, 1973).  
 Kruger (2003) integrated the proximal constructs of empathic concern (Batson, 
Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson, 1997) and self-other overlap (Cialdini, 
Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997) into a model of kin helping. Similar to 
Korchmaros and Kenny (2001), Kruger (2003) found indirect effects of these constructs 
on the link between genetic relatedness and intentions to help in hypothetical life-or-
death situations. The majority of the unique variance accounted for by genetic 
relatedness, however, was not accounted for by these proximal mechanisms. In other 
words, there remain unspecified mediators operating on this relation. 
These findings, and several others (for reviews see Burnstein, 2005; Kurland & 
Gaulin, 2005), represent a body of empirical evidence supporting the notion that altruistic 
behavior among kin is predictable from the tenets of inclusive fitness theory. But what 
about altruism when the r is removed from Hamilton’s rule (c < rb)? Outside of kin 
relationships, cooperative behavior results in a cost to the altruist and a gain to the 
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recipient that is not offset by the degree of shared genetic material. Thus, we are once 
again faced with the paradox of altruism.  
Cooperation Beyond Kin 
 Various evidence of altruistic behavior directed to non-kin exists for humans 
(Brown, & Brown, 2006; Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1989), and for other 
species as well (Trivers, 1985; Wilkinson, 1988). In the first of his seminal contributions 
to evolutionary theory, Robert Trivers (1971) laid the foundation for a theoretical 
framework that could explain this altruistic behavior outside of the direct operability of 
Hamilton’s Rule, but still within the boundaries of evolutionary theory. His theory of 
reciprocal altruism simply states that altruistic behavior among non-kin can evolve so 
long as these acts were reciprocated at some future date and that the benefit to the 
recipient was greater than the cost to the altruist. Assuming that human ancestors in the 
environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990) lived in 
close, interdependent groups with low dispersal rates, the stage would be set for 
reciprocal exchanges of resources that benefited both parties (Trivers, 1971). That is, 
when shared food, tools, knowledge, etc. is repaid (not necessarily in kind) by the 
recipient, both parties experience a net increase in fitness (Burnstein, 2005). 
 Computer simulations of the prisoner’s dilemma have provided support for the 
theory of reciprocal altruism. If this game is only played once, the logical strategy is to 
defect (i.e., not cooperate). Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) showed that the key to shifting 
player’s decisions toward cooperating is to repeat the game several times, with neither 
player knowing when it will end—as is often the case in real life. Within this context, the 
dominant strategy is called tit for tat: start by cooperating and continue to do so as long as 
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the other person cooperates; if the other person defects, then defect. Interestingly, this 
very basic strategy encompasses many of the issues discussed by Trivers (1971), most 
notably cheating. 
 Acting in a cooperative manner leaves one vulnerable to being cheated. The 
recipient of an altruistic act has the opportunity to not reciprocate at all, resulting in the 
altruist incurring the cost without any compensating benefits (gross cheating). The 
recipient also has the opportunity to reciprocate, but by less than what he/she was given 
(subtle cheating). Given the vast amount of cooperation exhibited by humans despite this 
vulnerability, it is perhaps not surprising that Tooby and Cosmides (1992) were able to 
uncover a system of psychological mechanisms that they claim represent evolved 
adaptations to detect cheaters within the context of social exchange. A clever set of 
studies illustrated that logic puzzles that people are typically unable to solve (e.g., The 
Wason Selection Task; Wason, 1966) become obvious when they are framed as a social 
contract. In the Wason selection task, participants are presented with four cards. Each 
card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. Participants can only see one side 
of the card and are asked to test rules like "if a card has an even number on one side, then 
it has a vowel on the other". The majority of participants are unable to select the correct 
cards to flip to test the rule. If a situation with the same logical structure is presented as a 
social contract, however, participants fare much better. For example, imagine a situation 
where a bouncer is working at a bar and he must ensure no one under eighteen years old 
is drinking. The rule to test is "if a person is drinking, s/he must be eighteen or older". 
Participants are more likely to select the correct answer of the beer drinker and the 
sixteen-year old if they must select who to check out of: someone drinking a beer, 
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someone drinking a pop, a twenty-five year old, or a sixteen-year old (Buss, 2004). This 
finding has been replicated several times, including using cross-cultural samples (for a 
review, see Cosmides & Tooby, 2005), and provides further evidence that individuals 
appear able to intuitively parse situations into costs and benefits. For example, if 
someone under eighteen is drinking at the bar, they are receiving a benefit without 
meeting the requirement (i.e., the cost) of being of legal age to drink. These cheater 
detection mechanisms are also of interest for potentially drawing distinctions between the 
psychological processes involved in kin versus non-kin altruism. 
Kin Versus Non-Kin Altruism 
 The adaptive value of mechanisms for cheater detection in social exchange does 
not necessarily follow from inclusive fitness theory, but can be seen as necessary for 
reciprocal altruism. This is due to inclusive fitness effects mitigating the need for 
reciprocity. More specifically, social exchange among kin does not require reciprocity to 
the same degree as exchange with non-kin because any benefit realized by kin also 
benefits the altruist due to the overlap in genetic material. Thus, discriminating against 
non-reciprocating individuals cannot be easily explained by kin selection (Trivers, 1971). 
This is in contrast to social exchange outside of kin relationships, which Trivers felt was 
subject to reciprocal altruism selection. To have evolved, non-kin altruism would have 
required equity in exchange. As such, mechanisms to monitor and enforce this equity 
would have been selected for due to their adaptive value in these situations during the 
EEA.  
 Maintaining exchange equity in non-kin relationships may involve separate 
psychological mechanisms from those used for kin altruism. Burnstein (2005) succinctly 
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notes the key theoretical point that “social bargains demand policing; kin altruism does 
not” (Burnstein, 2005, p. 547). To operate efficiently, this system of social exchange 
mechanisms would need to be functionally organized. 
Regulation of the Reciprocal Altruism System 
 The theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism parsimoniously specify 
conditions under which tendencies for altruistic behavior could have evolved. Largely 
missing from the work of Hamilton, Trivers, and those who have come after them, 
however, is a thorough discussion and empirical testing of proximate mechanisms that 
give rise to these altruistic behaviors. A systematic exploration of emotion-states 
resulting from the detection of domain-specific environmental cues may help provide 
insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying altruistic behavior in kin and non-
kin relationships. This process involves taking a social functional perspective on emotion. 
 Based on his interactions with several geographically dispersed tribes during his 
voyage on the Beagle, Darwin (1872) was one of the first to make the observation that 
emotional displays (e.g., furrowed brows, eyebrow flashes) serve a communicative 
function and may represent a universal human trait--a claim that was later empirically 
bolstered (Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1977). Rather than viewing emotions as debased or 
disruptive to more rational cognitive processing, a functional approach attempts to define 
emotions in terms of how they enable individuals to effectively respond to situational 
challenges and opportunities (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner, 
et al., 2006; Levenson, 1999).  
 Tooby and Cosmides (1990; 2005; 2008) posit that emotions can be seen as 
super-ordinate programs that organize and coordinate psychological mechanisms based 
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on context. They claim that emotions evolved due to repeated encounters with similar 
situations that required guided information processing and behavior. Each emotion-state 
is associated with the activation and deactivation of psychological mechanisms in a 
manner that guides cognition and behavior adaptively. From this functional perspective, 
emotions can be seen as domain-specific algorithms that take specific environmental cues 
as input, and lead to thoughts and behaviors (i.e., output) that would have been adaptive 
during the EEA. 
 Challenges and opportunities faced by humans include finding and retaining a 
mate, rearing and protecting offspring, and maintaining social order and group 
organization. These fundamental social tasks are accomplished in part with the help of 
specific emotional responses that arise from situational cues unique to these domains. For 
example, the identification of a suitable and valued mate is linked with feelings of desire 
and love (Buss, 1994; Gonzaga, Keltner, Londahl, & Smith, 2001), and to hormonal 
responses that facilitate sexual behavior (Diamond, 2003). Rivals who are perceived to be 
threatening to a romantic bond are linked with feelings of jealousy (Buss & Schmidt, 
1993). The attachment system contains a complex set of emotions that guide both rearing 
and protecting young (Bowlby, 1969; 1973; 1979; 1980) and maintaining romantic bonds 
(Hazan & Shaver, 1987).  
 Although this conceptualization of emotion was not available to Trivers (1971), 
the psychological system he claimed was selected for to regulate the altruism system is 
compatible with the more refined ideas of Tooby and Cosmides (1990; 2005; 2008). He 
proposed that liking or disliking exchange partners, moralistic aggression, gratitude, guilt, 
trust, and some forms of dishonesty and hypocrisy all represent adaptations to regulate 
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the altruism system. Importantly, Trivers (1971) felt that this suite of adaptations 
operated in exchange situations both between kin and between non-kin. Based on the 
nature of inclusive fitness effects, however, he claimed that the psychological system he 
posited to regulate reciprocal altruism was the result of reciprocal altruistic selection. If 
this is true, differences may exist in the operation of this system during kin and non-kin 
exchange situations. Testing the proximal activation and behavioral outcomes of 
exchange-related emotions across these situations represents one way to potentially 
investigate these differences, yet up to this point no research has set out to do so. 
Present Research 
 By examining the interrelations between social emotions, situational cues 
associated with equity of exchange, and kinship, the current studies attempted to more 
clearly specify how emotions function to regulate social exchange. Based on the logic of 
inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), it was 
expected that non-kin exchange will involve more intense emotional responses when 
compared to exchange with kin. In addition, because social emotions are proposed to 
function to police equity in social exchange, emotion-states were predicted to lead to 
differences in altruistic decision making toward non-kin compared to kin exchange 
partners. The current research was primarily focused on one negative emotion (anger) 
and one positive emotion (gratitude).  
 Anger is associated with appraisals of offense or injury and a sense of confidence 
and certainty that what has happened was caused by someone else (as opposed to by the 
situation or the self) (Lazarus, 1991; Wiener, 1980; 1986); appraisals that can lead to 
aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 1990). Being angry is linked to physiological changes 
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that might prepare one to fight, such as blood flow to the hands (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983), and activation in the left frontal hemisphere of the brain, a pattern 
characteristic of approach motivation (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001). In the context 
of social exchange, when an exchange partner does not reciprocate after an altruistic act, 
a state of anger serves to communicate the altruist’s displeasure with this situation. As an 
agitated and potentially aggressive state of arousal, anger holds the threat of physical 
confrontation as well as the potential for the discontinuation of the exchange relationship 
(Nesse, 1990; Trivers, 1971). In the current research, anger was generally expected to be 
triggered by uncooperative or inequitable behaviors committed by exchange partners. 
This anger, however, was predicted to be more intense during interaction with non-kin 
compared to kin exchange partners because the costs of uncooperative behavior by kin 
are partially mitigated by shared benefits from a genetic perspective. Once triggered, a 
state of anger was expected to motivate less cooperative, more punitive behaviors toward 
exchange partners. These behaviors, however, were predicted to be more prevalent during 
interaction with non-kin compared to with kin exchange partners based on the notion that 
anger functions to police social exchange and that exchange in the absence of inclusive 
fitness demands more careful consideration of relative costs and benefits.  
 Gratitude is a positive emotion linked to appraisals that the self has received a 
positive outcome that was caused by the actions of someone else (McCollough, 
Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001; Weiner, 1985). The experience of gratitude is a 
relatively understudied construct. It has, however, been shown to foster prosocial 
behavior in both beneficiaries and benefactors (McCollough, et al., 2001). From a 
functional perspective, feelings of gratitude after being the recipient of an altruistic act 
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serve as a motivator to alter weightings in decision rules related to future exchange 
interaction with the altruist (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). In Trivers’ (1971) model, 
gratitude is proposed to regulate responses to altruistic acts in a manner that considers the 
cost/benefit ratios of such acts. This proposition has received some preliminary empirical 
support, with larger (compared to smaller) benefits received from exchange partners 
leading to more felt gratitude and altruistic future behaviors in a laboratory setting 
(Tsang, 2007). The experience of gratitude thus appears to be triggered partly based on an 
assessment of the subjective value of a benefit from an altruistic act. As such, in the 
current research, more cooperative and altruistic behaviors from exchange partners in 
general were expected to trigger feelings of gratitude. Benefits received as a result of 
altruistic behavior from kin, however, were expected to evoke less gratitude than the 
same benefits received from non-kin altruism. Again, this prediction stemmed from the 
assumed operation of Hamilton's rule, with the relative costs and benefits of exchange 
varying based on the presence or absence of inclusive fitness effects. In line with this 
reasoning, a state of gratitude was expected to motivate more cooperative and altruistic 
behavior toward exchange partners in general, but more so for non-kin compared to kin 
partners.  
 The current research was comprised of two studies and is the first to examine 
emotions as a proximal process associated with decision making related to exchange 
situations across kin and non-kin relationships. Despite the fact that humans spend so 
much time interacting with family members, empirical research on kin relations remains 
understudied by social psychologists (Daly, Salmon, & Wilson, 1997; Salmon & 
Shackelford, 2011). The current research aimed to help address this gap in the literature 
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by utilizing structured exchange situations to test evolutionary psychological hypotheses 
related to how individuals think, feel, and behave during interaction with kin and non-kin. 
The primary expectation of this research was that these exchange situations will detect 
differences in emotional response (Study 1) and function (Study 2) for interaction with 
kin compared to with non-kin based on the inclusive fitness effects present during kin 
exchange.  
Study 1 
 Guided by both inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism 
theory (Trivers, 1971), Study 1 was designed to test the notion that emotional responses 
to exchange situations vary depending on relationship type. From a genetic perspective, 
costs incurred during exchange with a genetic relative are partly offset by shared benefits 
(i.e., inclusive fitness effects; Hamilton, 1964). In contrast, there is no discounting 
mechanism operating on the costs and benefits during exchange with non-kin. As such, 
reciprocal altruism theory posits that non-kin social exchange must be more strictly 
policed and that this is partly achieved by social emotions such as gratitude and anger 
(Trivers, 1971). Based on this theoretical rationale, the goal of Study 1 was to test the 
prediction that individuals would report more intense emotional responses after 
interacting with unrelated relationship partners compared to with genetic relatives. 
 The subjective costs and benefits during interaction between dyads is a key 
element to modeling social behavior using interdependence theory (Kelley, Holmes, 
Kerr, Reis, Rusbult, & Van Lange, 2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Varying the 
cost/benefit structure of situations has also been fruitfully utilized by experimental 
economists and game theorists to study human decision making (Camerer, 2003), and has 
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more recently begun to emerge as a tool for evolutionary social psychologists. For 
example, the prisoner's dilemma is one of game theory's simplest and most widely known 
frameworks for studying strategic behavior (Van Vugt & Van Lange, 2006). If the game 
is played only once, the dilemma arises because the payoff structure favors each player 
defecting despite the fact that this results in a lower benefit compared to what the players 
would each receive if they had cooperated. But what if the players were siblings? If 
Hamilton's r is incorporated into the payoff structure, the cost of being defected against 
by a sibling is mitigated by a mutual shared benefit. In this case, each payoff to a sibling 
is worth its face value, as well as half the other sibling's payoff (from an inclusive fitness 
perspective). Adding Hamilton's Rule and kinship to the prisoner's dilemma leads to 
cooperating becoming the dominant strategy (Kenrick, Sundie, & Kurzban, 2008). Of 
course, this is an abstract and purely theoretical thought exercise, but it does illustrate the 
potential for combining game theory and evolutionary social psychology. 
 Study 1 utilized a structured situation taken from experimental economics called 
the ultimatum game. This game is an experimental tool first developed by economists for 
studying cooperation between individuals (Camerer, 2003). In the ultimatum game, two 
individuals must make decisions related to the allocation of some valued good (typically 
money). Players are designated into roles, with one individual acting as the Proposer and 
the other as the Responder. The Proposer acts first and makes an offer to the Responder 
for how to split some amount (e.g., $10). The Responder can then either take the 
Proposer's offer, or reject it, in which case both individuals receive nothing. Based on this 
situation, a rational response from the Responder is to accept any offer greater than zero. 
Experimental economic research using the ultimatum game has shown that, contrary a 
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normative rational response, offers below 20% of the endowment are usually rejected 
(Camerer, 2003). This divergence from strictly rational choices points to the ultimatum 
game triggering social processes associated with assessments of fairness and punishment 
behavior. 
 Evolutionary psychological research using the ultimatum game has found that 
tendencies toward making cooperative offers vary according to factors such as anonymity 
and reputational concerns (Lamba & Mace, 2010), and the fluctuating asymmetries of the 
Proposer (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007). There has also been some general psychological 
research that has examined the role of emotions on offers and responses during the 
ultimatum game. For example, Responders who communicate anger during the ultimatum 
game receive larger offers from Proposers than Responders who communicate happiness, 
but this effect is attenuated by situational factors such as the Proposer's ability to deceive  
and when the consequences of an offer being rejected are low (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, 
Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008). Another study used coded video of facial expressions from 
individuals in both roles of the ultimatum game and found that cooperative individuals 
were more likely to express both positive and negative emotions, a finding that illustrates 
the importance of the role emotion plays in guiding altruistic decision making (Schug, 
Matsumoto, Horita, Yamagishi, & Bonnet, 2010). 
 To test the idea that emotional responses during social exchange are more intense 
when interacting with non-kin than with kin, an experiment was designed using a 
hypothetical iterated version of the ultimatum game and four classes of relationships: 
strangers, friends, cousins, and siblings. Specifically, participants were asked to imagine 
playing the role of Responder in an ultimatum game and reported their emotional 
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responses to receiving generous, reciprocal, and unfair offers from each of the 
relationship partners. An iterated, as opposed to a one-shot, version of the ultimatum 
game was chosen to more closely simulate the ongoing interaction involved in an actual 
social relationship (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Camerer, 2003). 
 This design, which is presented in greater detail below, allowed Study 1 to test 
two main hypotheses. First, that emotional responses will differ based on offer sizes, with 
generous and fair offers leading to more gratitude and less anger than unfair offers, and 
unfair offers leading to more anger and less gratitude (hypothesis 1a; a main effect of 
offer size). More importantly, an offer size by relationship type interaction was expected 
such that, for each offer size, participants will report more intense emotions for offers 
from genetically unrelated individuals compared with cousins and siblings (hypothesis 
1b: an interaction between offer size and relationship type). More specifically, the 
intensity of emotional response was expected to vary according to the degree of 
relatedness, with stranger's offers leading to the highest emotional response, followed by 
friends, then cousins, then siblings.  
Method 
Participants 
 A sample of 52 undergraduate psychology students from a university in 
Southwestern Ontario participated in exchange for partial course credit. The average age 
of the sample was 19.51 years old (SD = 6.4 years; range of 17 to 53). Of the 52 
participants, 20 were male and 32 were female. In order to participate, all subjects met 
the selection criterion of having a same-sex sibling, cousin, and friend. Four additional 
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individuals participated in the experiment but their data were excluded because they 
reported that their sibling was either a step-sibling or a half-sibling.  
Procedure 
 Participants reported to a laboratory and completed all measures using a personal 
computer outfitted with MediaLab questionnaire software. After reading and signing 
informed consent forms, participants were asked to enter the names of three same-sex 
relationship partners: a friend, a cousin, and a sibling. A computer program inserted these 
names into items and stimuli where appropriate for the remainder of the study. A same-
sex individual named Paul for men and Mary for women was also included in subsequent 
conditions as a 'stranger'.  Participants were then given a detailed description of the 
ultimatum game. After receiving this description of the game, each participant then rated 
how they would feel after receiving three different offers for how to split $100 from each 
of the four relationship partners. These combinations resulted in a 3 (offer size: $20/$80, 
$50/$50, $80/$20) by 4 (relationship type: stranger, friend, cousin, sibling) repeated 
measures design. The various combinations of offers and relationship partners were 
presented in one of two orders: either cycling through the same offer across the 
relationship partners, or cycling through the 3 offers for each relationship partner.  
Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Materials 
Demographic and relationship partner information. Participants were first asked 
to complete the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) to measure their current emotional state. Next, participants were asked 
for their age and sex. In addition, for each friend, cousin, and sibling, participants 
20 
 
 
completed items that measured the partner's age, emotional closeness felt toward the 
partner, inclusion of other in self, and felt similarity toward the partner. Specifically, 
emotional closeness was measured using the single item "How emotionally close do you 
feel toward (name inserted by questionnaire software)"? with a 7-point Likert-type scale 
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much so). Felt similarity was also measured with a single Likert-
type item "How similar to do you feel to (name inserted by questionnaire software)" (1 = 
not at all; 7 = very much so). Inclusion of other in self (IOS) was measured using a set of 
seven pairs of circles that vary in the degree to which they overlap, with 1 = circles 
hardly overlapping and 7 = circles that almost completely overlap (Aron, Aron & 
Smollan, 1992). These items were included for use as covariates during discriminant 
analyses. 
 Ultimatum game instructions. Participants received a detailed description of the 
rules of the ultimatum game. This was done using a series of slides within the 
questionnaire software that included both text and a visual depiction of the ultimatum 
game. Specifically, participants were shown an iterated version of the ultimatum game 
using a series of examples in which the Proposer and Responder take turns making 
decisions for how to split $100. Finally, they were told that they would next be asked to 
imagine playing the game with the relationship partners they had previously identified.  
Exchange stimuli. Participants were asked to imagine themselves as having just 
acted as the Proposer and making a $50/$50 offer to one of their relationship partners and 
that the partner accepted the offer. They were then asked to imagine that in the next 
round of the game, they will act as the Responder and their partner will be the Proposer. 
The Proposer offers were an $80/$20 split, a $50/$50 split, or a $20/$80 split. All three 
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offers were presented for each of the relationship partners, setting up a 3 (offer) by 4 
(relationship type) repeated measures design.  
 Dependent measures.  After each of the 12 conditions (3 offer sizes by 4 
relationship partners), participants were asked to rate the degree to which they would 
experience a series of emotions. Specifically, participants were asked the degree to which 
they would feel gratitude and anger. In addition to these two main outcomes, participants 
also rated how disappointed and uneasy they would feel. They also rated how likely they 
felt each partner would be to make each offer. All of these dependent measures were 
measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1= not at all, 7 = very much so). Finally, 
participants were asked how much of the $100 they would offer to each partner as the 
Proposer in the next round of the game. These additional outcome variables were 
included for exploratory purposes.  
Results 
 To provide a sense of the interrelation between the dependent variables, partial 
correlations are presented in Table 1. These correlations are presented with the effect of 
the experimental conditions statistically removed. The negative valenced responses of 
anger, disappointment, and uneasy were positively correlated with each other and 
negatively correlated with gratitude.  
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Table 1. 
Study 1 - Partial correlations between dependent measures controlling for experimental 
conditions of offer and relationship type 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
1. Anger -      
2. Disappointment  .75* -     
3. Uneasy  .47***  .55*** -    
4. Gratitude -.31*** -.32*** -.16*** -   
5. Likelihood -.31*** -.34*** -.38*** .19*** -  
6. Next Offer -.19*** -.17***  .02 .05   .02 - 
       
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
Main Analysis 
 To test Study 1's main hypotheses, a mixed model ANOVA was conducted for 
each of the dependent measures (i.e., six models in total).  These models were estimated 
using the MIXED procedure in SPSS and included random intercepts for relationship 
type and offer. Including these random intercepts allowed the analyses to model variation 
in how individuals generally differ in their emotional responses across relationship type 
and offer size. This method of analysis provides results similar to a repeated-measures 
ANOVA, but allows for greater flexibility for modeling within individual variance on 
dependent measures. The models were specified such that the three offer sizes and the 
four relationship types were treated as repeated factors.  
 The results of the tests for main effects and interactions from these models are 
presented in Table 2. There was a significant main effect of offer size for each of the 
dependent measures. This finding fits with Study 1's general expectation of emotional 
reactions varying based on the size of an exchange partner's offer (i.e., hypothesis 1a). 
Significant main effects of relationship type were found for all of the dependent measures 
except for uneasy and expected. The main effects were qualified by significant 
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relationship type by offer size interactions for all of the dependent measures. The 
significant interactions justified post hoc analyses. All post hoc tests of mean differences 
used the Bonferroni adjustment to control for family-wise error rate. 
Table 2 
Study 1 - F-Ratios for Main Effects and Offer by Relationship Type Interactions 
    
 Relationship Type Offer Rel. Type x Offer 
    
 Gratitude          20.20***      173.62***            5.99*** 
 Anger          8.71***      146.42***            5.06*** 
 Disappointed          2.98*      250.23***            2.87** 
 Uneasy          0.83      78.43***            3.01** 
 Likelihood          1.28      151.62***            6.46*** 
 Next Offer          10.64***      86.12***            2.93** 
    
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
 All cell means and standard deviations from this analysis are presented in Table 3. 
The pattern of means will be discussed for each outcome measure in turn. Means for 
gratitude have been plotted graphically in Figure 1. Participants generally reported 
feeling more gratitude for larger offers. Examining how gratitude varied across both 
relationship types and offer sizes shows that, as predicted in hypothesis 1b, participants 
reported more gratitude for offers made by genetically unrelated individuals. There were 
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Table 3 
Study 1 - Means and Standard Deviations for Offer by Relationship Type Conditions 
       
 Gratitude Anger Disappointed Uneasy Likelihood Next Offer 
       
 $20/$80       
       Stranger 3.35 (1.75) 4.81 (1.85) 5.58 (1.64) 3.98 (2.23) 4.10 (1.59) 28.81 (17.38) 
       Friend 2.56 (1.75) 4.02 (1.99) 4.65 (2.27) 3.58 (2.24) 2.83 (1.88) 34.23 (17.36) 
       Cousin 2.42 (1.65) 3.98 (2.25) 4.54 (2.30) 3.13 (2.05) 3.00 (2.08) 36.35 (17.85) 
       Sibling 1.92 (1.04) 3.12 (1.73) 4.52 (1.91) 3.42 (2.19) 3.12 (2.08) 40.48 (18.74) 
       
 $50/$50       
       Stranger 5.77 (1.28) 1.27 (0.77) 1.75 (1.17) 1.81 (1.60) 5.31 (1.89) 46.21 (11.19) 
       Friend 5.13 (1.62) 1.21 (0.82) 1.44 (1.09) 1.42 (0.94) 6.04 (1.41) 50.67 (5.24) 
       Cousin 4.88 (1.72) 1.25 (0.79) 1.38 (0.87) 1.25 (0.62) 5.38 (1.73) 48.75 (7.60) 
       Sibling 4.35 (1.92) 1.10 (0.41) 1.44 (1.09) 1.37 (1.14) 4.56 (2.08) 49.42 (10.23) 
       
 $80/$20       
       Stranger 6.42 (1.13) 1.42 (1.05) 1.75 (1.28) 4.06 (1.99) 2.21 (1.33) 50.29 (21.25) 
       Friend 6.46 (1.09) 1.35 (0.97) 1.94 (1.61) 4.46 (2.00) 2.54 (1.46) 61.92 (19.63) 
       Cousin 6.35 (1.34) 1.42 (1.23) 2.31 (1.79) 4.71 (1.88) 2.73 (1.57) 52.69 (16.31) 
       Sibling 6.25 (1.36) 1.38 (0.97) 1.83 (1.45) 4.65 (2.08) 2.79 (1.96) 64.81 (20.27) 
       
       
 
 no significant differences for the $80/$20 offer, probably due to ceiling effects. There 
were, however, significant mean differences across relationship type for the $50/$50 
offer, with gratitude felt toward strangers being higher than toward friends (p < .01), 
cousins (p < .001), and siblings (p < .001). Gratitude felt toward siblings was 
significantly less than was felt toward friends (p < .001), and cousins (p < .05). For the 
$20/$80 offer, a similar pattern emerged, with participants reporting significantly more 
gratitude toward strangers compared to friends (p < .01), cousins (p < .001), and siblings 
(p < .001).  The pattern of reported gratitude for the $20/$80 offer is interesting, 
especially within the stranger condition. As would be expected for the lowest offer size, 
gratitude was lowest after the $20/$80 split, but this small offer from strangers triggered 
more gratitude compared the other relationship partners. Overall, an explanation for this 
pattern is unclear, although it could be because participants expected a smaller offer from 
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a stranger and were relatively more satisfied with this offer size from a stranger compared 
to the other relationship partners.  
Gratitude
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Figure 1 - Study 1 Means for Gratitude Across Offer Size and Relationship Type 
 
 Means for anger have been plotted in Figure 2. Participants reported higher levels 
of anger when offered a $20/$80 split and very little anger after the other two offers. 
Focusing on variation in reported anger across the relationship type for the $20/$80 offer 
once again found support for hypothesis 1b, with higher levels of reported emotion for 
offers made by genetically unrelated individuals. Specifically, participants reported more 
anger after receiving a $20/$80 offer from a stranger when compared to friends (p < .07), 
cousins (p < .05), and siblings (p < .001). Receiving this offer from a sibling resulted in 
significantly less anger when compared to friends (p < .05), and cousins (p < .05). 
 A similar pattern to anger was found for disappointment. There was little 
disappointment reported after the $50/$50 and $80/$20 offers. Participants did, however, 
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feel disappointed after receiving a $20/$80 offer, but more so from a stranger when 
compared to friends (p < .05), cousins (p < .01), and siblings (p < .01). 
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Figure 2 - Study 1 Means for Anger Across Offer Size and Relationship Type 
 
 A different pattern emerged for the uneasy outcome variable. Means for uneasy 
are presented in Figure 3. Participants generally reported feeling less uneasy after 
receiving a $50/$50 offer compared to after a $20/$80 or $80/$20 offer. Examining the 
mean differences in uneasy across relationship types revealed no significant differences 
for the $80/$20 offer, and a difference between strangers and cousins for both the 
$20/$80 offer (p < .05) and the $50/$50 offer (p < .01). The difference in uneasiness 
between strangers and siblings for the $50/$50 offer was marginally different (p < .06).   
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Figure 3 - Study 1 Means for Uneasy Across Offer Size and Relationship Type 
 
  Participants were more likely to expect their exchange partners to make a $50/$50 
offer relative to the other offer sizes (see Figure 4). Within the $50/$50 condition, friends 
were rated as more likely to make this offer size compared to siblings (p < .001). 
Strangers were rated more likely to make a $20/$80 offer more so than friends (p < .001), 
cousins (p < .01), and siblings (p < .05).  
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Figure 4 - Study 1 Means for Likelihood of Offer Across Offer Size and Relationship Type 
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 Finally, after being instructed to imagine switching roles and playing a new 
round, participants generally made similar offers to the one they had just received. There 
were, however, differences within previous offer sizes across relationship types. After 
receiving a $20/$80 offer, participants stated that they would subsequently make 
significantly smaller offers to strangers compared to cousins (p < .01) and siblings (p < 
.001). After receiving a $50/$50 offer, participants reported that they would make larger 
subsequent offers to their friends compared to strangers in the next round (p < .01). After 
a $80/$20 offer, larger offers were made to friends compared with strangers (p < .001) 
and cousins (p < .01). Siblings were given larger offers than strangers (p < .001) and 
cousins (p < .001).  
Discriminant Analyses  
 Another set of analyses were conducted to rule out of the possibility that the 
differences in emotional response across relationship type were due to variables shown to 
be important by previous related research. For example, Korchmaros and Kenny (2001) 
found that emotional closeness mediated the relation between genetic relatedness and 
willingness to act altruistically toward a relationship partner. Re-running the current 
analyses with emotional closeness as a covariate did not alter the results for any of the 
emotion outcomes. In other words, the emotional responses to the various offer sizes 
across relationship types did not vary based on how emotionally close subjects felt 
toward their relationship partners. There were main effects of emotional closeness on the 
likelihood and next offer variables, but including this covariate did not affect the 
significance or pattern of the relationship type by offer interactions. It should be noted 
that these discriminant analyses were conducted without data from the stranger condition 
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because the covariates were not applicable. Means and standard deviations for the 
variables used in the discriminant analyses are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Study 1 - Mean and Standard Deviations for Relationship Partner Measures 
     
 Age Emotional 
Closeness 
IOS Felt 
Similarity 
     
 Friend 20.96 (11.87) 5.15 (1.48) 4.90 (1.62) 4.67 (1.37) 
 Cousin 22.28 (12.59) 3.44 (1.92) 3.25 (1.70) 3.37 (1.73) 
 Sibling 19.11 (7.86) 5.77 (1.43) 5.50 (1.44) 4.79 (1.45) 
     
 
 A relationship partner's age is another factor related to altruistic behaviors toward 
kin, a finding attributed to the relation between age and reproductive fitness (Burnstein, 
et al., 1994; Smith, Kish, & Crawford, 1987). Including partner age as a covariate did not 
alter the results for any of the outcome variables except for disappointment. There was a 
main effect of a partner's age on the disappointment variable and the interaction between 
relationship type and offer size was no longer statistically significant. It should be noted, 
however, that the age difference required to significantly influence altruistic decision 
making is likely much larger than the relatively small variance in partner age found in the 
current sample.  
 Similar patterns of results were found for the discriminant analyses using the 
inclusion of other in self (IOS) and similarity variables. Neither of these variables 
impacted the results for any of the emotion outcomes. There were main effects of IOS 
and similarity for the likelihood and next offer outcomes, but including these variables as 
a covariate did not alter the pattern of significance of the relationship type by offer size 
interactions.  
30 
 
 
 Another set of analyses were run to test if there were sex differences for 
emotional response across levels of relationship type. Although no a priori hypotheses 
related to sex differences were made for Study 1, when compared to men, females have 
been previously shown to treat non-kin more like kin in contexts such as nepotism and 
incest avoidance (Ackerman, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2007). There were no significant main 
effects or interactions when participant sex was added to the models. As such, it appears 
that men and women do not differ in their emotional response to offer sizes across levels 
of relationship type. 
 Finally, re-running the main analyses controlling for baseline mood (measured 
with the PANAS) and including the order in which participants were presented with the 
offers as a factor did not alter any of the results.  
Discussion 
 Study 1 was generally supportive of hypotheses 1a and 1b. Participants reported 
emotional responses that varied based on offer size, with smaller offers leading to more 
anger and disappointment and larger offers leading to more gratitude (hypothesis 1a). 
Importantly, probing the interaction between offers size and relationship type using 
pairwise comparisons found that these emotional responses differed in a manner 
consistent with the evolutionary theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism 
(hypothesis 1b).  
 As predicted by hypothesis 1b, offer size and relationship type interacted to 
predict gratitude in a manner that generally conformed more intense emotional response 
for non-kin, with offers from the least related individuals (i.e., strangers) leading to the 
most intense gratitude and offers from kin (i.e., cousins and siblings) leading to the least 
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intense gratitude. This step pattern was also found for anger after an unfair offer, with the 
most intense anger being reported for strangers and the least for siblings. 
 The exploratory outcome variables also led to some instructive findings. The 
results from reported uneasiness across offer sizes points to a preference for $50/$50 
offers. This finding fits with the notion of reciprocal responses (i.e., tit-for-tat) being a 
normative strategy during exchange situations. Also of interest was the pattern of means 
for the likelihood variable. Strangers were rated most likely to make unfair offers, a 
finding that may be related to why participants reported feeling more gratitude when 
strangers acted cooperatively. The fact that friends were rated as most likely to make a 
reciprocal $50/$50 offer further fits with the rationale that underpins reciprocal altruism 
theory. More specifically, in the absence of inclusive fitness effects, altruism among non-
kin partners requires equity in exchange over time. Finally, the likelihood variable led to 
an interesting finding when considered in combination with the result from the emotion 
outcome variables for strangers. Participants reported higher levels of anger and gratitude 
after a stranger's unfair offer despite also reporting that they felt that strangers were most 
likely to make this small offer. This finding does not follow from more general theories 
of emotion in which affect is triggered by expectancy violations (e.g., Bercheid, 1983; 
Carver & Sheier, 1990; Mandler, 1975) and thus may represent evidence for a process 
unique to non-kin exchange situations. 
 How and when an emotion is triggered is only part of piecing together a social-
functional explanation of emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 
2006). From an evolutionary perspective, active emotion states are posited to serve as 
logic executors that lead to patterns of cognitive and behavioral response that would have 
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been adaptive in the EEA (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). As 
such, feelings of gratitude and anger may be associated with a predictable pattern of 
outcomes that vary based on evolutionary important situational cues like kinship.  
Study 2 
 Do active emotion-states lead to differences in decision making across 
relationship types? Study 1 provided evidence showing that emotional responses during 
exchange situations are stronger for non-kin exchange partners. To extend this finding 
and further test a social-functional model of emotions within the context of the theories of 
inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism, Study 2 was designed to search for differences 
in exchange behaviors based on emotional experience and kinship.  
 Making inferences about the social function of an emotion requires first 
discovering the contextual inputs that trigger the emotional response, and then delineating 
its subsequent cognitive and behavioral outputs. In other words, one first needs to know 
what an emotion does before speculating about what an emotion is for. Study 2 's primary 
goal was to build on Study 1's results by investigating the cognitive and behavioral 
outcomes of anger and gratitude in the context of social exchange. If it is true that, as 
proposed by Trivers (1971), anger and gratitude function to regulate reciprocal altruism 
between non-kin, then in addition to being more likely to be triggered during non-kin 
exchange, these emotions should also be linked to outcomes during non-kin exchange 
that predictably differ from their outcomes during kin exchange. More specifically, 
feeling angry should lead to more punitive, less altruistic behaviors during exchange with 
non-related partners compared to with kin. Similarly, feelings of gratitude should lead to 
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more generous and cooperative behaviors during exchange with non-kin compared to 
with kin. 
 Previous research has shown that affective states (i.e., moods and emotions) are 
linked to the way individuals make judgments and decisions (for a review, see Forgas & 
George, 2001).  Most of this work has focused on positive and negative moods and found 
that mood valence influences judgments through factors such as selective retrieval of 
congruent information from memory (Bower, 1981), subjective mood interpretation 
(Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993), selecting actions to maintain or repair the current 
mood state (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988), and misattributing moods to judgments 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Valance of mood alone, however, cannot completely explain 
the link between affect and making judgments. For example, sadness and anger both have 
negative valence, but have different impacts on judgments stemming from appraisals of 
certainty and control (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Keltner, Ellsworth, & 
Edwards, 1993). Similarly, fear and anger both have negative valence, but lead to 
different assessments of risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  
 Experimental research on the effects of affect on social judgments and decision 
making has intentionally ignored contextual factors such as the nature of the relationship 
between individuals in order to focus on basic processes. Rather than acting as noise that 
obscures the operation of these basic processes, situational factors such as kinship may 
lead to theoretically important interactions between affect, and cognitive and behavioral 
outcomes. Study 2 introduced relationship type as a factor in order to test whether the 
effects of anger and gratitude impact altruistic decision making differently across the 
same four relationship types used in Study 1. Testing this idea involved a 3 (emotion 
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induction: anger, gratitude, control) by 4 (relationship partner: stranger, friend, cousin, 
sibling) by 2 (social dilemma task: take-some, give-some) experimental design.  
 The take-some and give-some dilemmas each present individuals with a situation 
in which they may act selfishly or altruistically toward a partner (Hamburger, 1974). In 
both of these situations, each partner is endowed with some tokens (typically chips or 
coins; e.g., Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Importantly, 
these tokens have twice the monetary value for one partner compared to the other. In the 
give-some dilemma, for example, each individual is endowed with tokens that are worth 
$X each if kept, or $2X each if given to the partner. Individuals have an opportunity to 
act selfishly and keep all their tokens for maximum profit, or give some coins to their 
partner, to whom they are worth twice as much. In the take-some dilemma, a partner's 
tokens are worth $2X each to the partner, and $X to the self. The decision in the take-
some dilemma is how many tokens to take from the partner. An individual may act 
cooperatively and not take any of the partner's more valuable tokens, or more selfishly 
and take some tokens for the self.  
 The take-some and give-some situations are structurally equivalent in the sense 
that tokens have the same relative value to the self and partner in each case. In other 
words, a typical token allocation in the take-some situation should just be in inverse of 
the give-some situation (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Psychological differences may 
exist, however, between these two dilemmas based on the distinction between giving and 
taking (Hamburger, 1974). Giving tokens involves incurring a personal cost for the 
benefit of a partner, whereas taking tokens involves getting a personal benefit at the cost 
of a partner. Drawing this psychological distinction gives the take-some dilemma 
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situational cues linked with the potential for punitive behaviors, and the give-some 
dilemma the potential for benevolent behaviors. These motives are linked to anger and 
gratitude respectively, and thus make the take-some and give-some situations well-suited 
for testing the current hypotheses. Moreover, including both situations maps onto the 
ongoing, interactional nature of an actual relationship, with both giving and taking 
occurring among partners across time. 
 Study 2's design allowed for a test of the three-way interaction between emotion 
induction, relationship type, and social dilemma (hypothesis 2a). Within the take-some 
dilemma participants were expected to take more tokens from strangers and friends 
compared to from cousins and siblings (hypothesis 2b). Importantly, the amounts 
allocated to strangers and friends were expected to interact with the emotion induction 
such that more tokens would be taken in the anger condition and less in the gratitude 
condition. The amounts taken from cousins and siblings were not expected to differ 
across the emotion induction conditions (hypothesis 2c). That is, the activation of anger 
and gratitude were expected to impact exchange behaviors and decision-making 
differently for kin compared to non-kin. This hypothesis is based on the notion that anger 
and gratitude are part of a psychological system that regulates reciprocal altruism, and 
that kin-based exchange is less likely to be influenced by this system (Trivers, 1971). 
 Within the give-some dilemma, a similar pattern was expected to emerge. 
Participants were expected to give more to siblings and cousins compared to strangers 
and friends (hypothesis 2d). As in the take-some condition, these differences were 
expected to fluctuate based on the emotion induction, but only for non-kin (i.e., strangers 
and friends). More specifically, the amounts given the strangers and friends were 
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expected to interact with the emotion induction such that more money would be given in 
the gratitude condition and less in the anger condition. The amount given to cousins and 
siblings was not expected to significantly differ across the emotion induction conditions 
(hypothesis 2e).   
Method 
Participants 
 A sample of 96 individuals participated in exchange for a $5 honorarium (either a 
Starbucks gift card or an electronic money transfer). Participants were recruited using 
advertisements posted around the campus of a university in Southwestern Ontario. The 
average age of the sample was 24.71 years old (SD = 7.33 years; range of 18 to 57). Of 
the 96 participants, 35 were male and 61 were female. In order to participate, all subjects 
met the selection criterion of having a same-sex sibling, cousin, and friend. Nine 
additional participants filled in the questionnaire, but their data were discarded because 
they did not complete the emotion induction task. 
 
Procedure 
 Data for Study 2 were collected online using questionnaire software. After 
reading informed consent information and verifying that they meet the selection criteria, 
participants provided demographic information (e.g., age, sex) and the names of a same-
sex friend, cousin, and sibling. An email address for each relationship partner was also 
requested. This information was not retained for ethical reasons. Rather, participants were 
asked to provide this information so that they could be given a cover story within the 
demographic questionnaire that told them their relationship partners would be sent the 
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results of their token allocation and that one of the relationship partners would be selected 
to actually receive the monetary equivalent of the tokens they were allocated during the 
social dilemma.  
 Each participant was then randomly assigned to an emotion induction (anger, 
gratitude, or control) and a social dilemma (take-some or give-some) condition. After 
reading a detailed set of instructions for how to play either the take-some or give-some 
game, participants completed the appropriate emotion induction exercise for their 
condition. Immediately after the emotion induction, participants were asked how they 
would behave in the social dilemma with each of the four relationship partners. For the 
stranger condition, participants were told that they have been matched with a same-sex 
individual who had previously completed the study named Taylor Anderson. After 
finishing the experiment, participants were told that their relationship partners would not 
be contacted and that the contact information they provided would be destroyed. Finally, 
participants were debriefed and asked for an email address to send their $5 compensation.   
Materials 
 Demographic and relationship partner information. Participants were first asked 
for their age and sex. Next, for each friend, cousin, and sibling, participants completed 
items that measure the partner's first name, age, emotional closeness felt toward the 
partner, inclusion of the other in self, and felt similarity toward the partner. This 
information was collected using the same 7-point Likert-type items that were used in 
Study 1. As in Study 1, this information was collected for use as covariates during 
discriminant analyses.  
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 Participants were also asked for an email address for each of their relationship 
partners. This contact information was ostensibly used to inform relationship partners 
what decisions were made by the participant in the social dilemmas and as a means of 
contacting the partners in the event that they were randomly selected to actually receive 
the monetary equivalent of their token allocation.  
 Emotion induction. Participants completed a directed writing task first developed 
by Strack, Schwarz, and Gschneidinger (1985) and validated in several studies (e.g., 
Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). One 
version of the task induced gratitude, and the other version induced anger. This exercise 
involves first asking participants to "briefly describe three to five things that make you 
feel [gratitude/angry]." Next, participants were asked to "describe in detail the one 
situation that made you feel the most [gratitude/anger] you have felt in your life, and 
describe it such that a person reading the description would feel [gratitude/anger] just 
from hearing the situation." Participants in the control condition were asked to name 
three to five things in the cereal aisle at their grocery store and then to describe the cereal 
aisle it in such detail that someone could picture it perfectly.  
 Manipulation check. A separate sample of 66 individuals was recruited using the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk service. Originally developed to allow computer software 
developers to use human intelligence to test their code, Mechanical Turk can also be used 
to run short surveys. The three manipulation check conditions each took approximately 5 
minutes to complete and were therefore well-suited for collection on Mechanical Turk. 
Twenty-two individuals were assigned to each of the three conditions. After completing 
either the gratitude, anger, or control directed writing task, participants rated the degree to 
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which they felt anger, gratitude, fear, shame, guilt, and pride using a 7-point Likert-type 
scale (1= not at all, 7 = very much so).  
 Social dilemma. In the take-some condition, participants were told that each of 
their relationship partners was endowed with 20 tokens that are worth 50 cents each to 
the partner, and 25 cents each to the participant. Participants were then asked to report 
how many of the tokens he/she wished to take from each of the four partners. Taking all 
of the partner's tokens would result in a maximum payoff for the participant of $5, and 
taking none of the partner's tokens would result in a maximum payoff for the partner of 
$10. After deciding how many tokens they wished to take from each partner, participants 
were presented with three follow-up items related to their allocation. Specifically, 
participants were asked to report how much anger and gratitude they would expect each 
partner to feel after learning how many of their tokens were taken. In addition, 
participants were asked to report how fair they think each partner would consider their 
token allocation. These follow-up items were assessed using a 7-point Likert-type scale. 
For example, the anger item asked: "Based on the number of tokens you decided to take 
from [Friend's name], how much anger do you think [Friend's name] will feel after 
finding out how you decided to allocate the tokens?" (1 = very little, 7 = very much). The 
follow-up items were included primarily for exploratory purposes, but also provide a link 
between Study 1 and Study 2 in that they measure emotional response.   
 In the give-some condition, participants were told that, for each of the four 
relationship partners, s/he was endowed with 20 tokens worth 25 cents each to the 
participant and 50 cents each to the partners. Participants then reported how many of their 
tokens they wished to give to each partner. Leaving all 20 tokens to a partner would 
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result in a maximum payoff to the partner of $10, and leaving no tokens would result in a 
maximum payoff to the participant of $5. As in the take-some condition, participants 
were presented with three follow-up items after their token allocation decisions using 7-
point Likert-type scales. Specifically, for each relationship partner, participants rated how 
much anger and gratitude they expected their partners would feel after learning about 
how many tokens they were given, as well as how fair they think each partner would 
consider their allocation. 
 In an attempt to increase the psychological realism of the situation, participants in 
both the take-some and give-some conditions were told that all of their relationship 
partners (and the previous participant used for the stranger condition) would be sent an 
email informing them of the results of the token allocation they decided upon. In 
addition, participants were told that one of their relationship partners would be randomly 
selected, and for that partner, the cash equivalent of their token allocation would be split 
between the participant and the partner. There were no emails sent, and no cash payments 
were made beyond the $5 compensation for participating in the study. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 Before the main analyses, data from the manipulation check sub-sample were 
analyzed. Of the 66 participants, 7 had to be dropped because they did not complete the 
emotion induction task. Of the remaining participants, 30 were male and 29 were female. 
Participants were 29.93 years old on average (SD = 9.04, range: 18-65).  
 A series of 1-way ANOVAs were run with the three level emotion induction task 
as the independent variable and the 6 emotions as the outcome variables. As expected, 
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there was a main effect of emotion induction on both gratitude (F (2, 56) = 32.02, p < 
.001) and anger (F (2, 56) = 63.60, p < .001). The emotion induction condition had no 
effect on the other 4 emotion items.  
 A series of post hoc comparisons were conducted on the means of felt gratitude 
and anger across levels of the emotion induction condition. These comparisons used the 
Bonferroni adjustment. Reported felt gratitude was significantly higher (p < .001) after 
the gratitude induction (M = 6.57, SD = 0.79) compared to after both the anger induction 
(M = 3.39, SD  = 2.25) and control task (M = 3.15, SD  = 1.72). Reported felt anger was 
significantly higher (p < .001) after the anger induction (M = 5.94, SD = 1.55) compared 
to after the gratitude induction (M = 1.57, SD  = 1.23) and control task (M = 2.03, SD  = 
1.19). The emotion induction manipulation, therefore, appears to have had its desired 
effect.  
Main Analyses 
 To test Study 2's main hypotheses, a series of 3-factor mixed model ANOVAs 
were conducted with two between-subjects variables (emotion induction and game type) 
and one within-subjects variable (relationship partner). These models were estimated 
using the MIXED procedure in SPSS and included a random intercept estimate for each 
dependent variable. The sample was randomly assigned across the between-subjects 
conditions such that each of the six cells had 16 participants. All post hoc comparisons of 
mean differences used the Bonferroni adjustment to control for family-wise error rate. 
 As predicted in hypothesis 2a, there was a significant 3-way interaction between 
game type, emotion induction, and relationship type on token allocation (F (6, 270) = 
3.29, p < .01). This highest-order interaction justified decomposing the model to examine 
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the emotion induction by relationship type interactions on token allocation within each of 
the two game types. Analyzing the pattern of means within the take-some and give-some 
game types allowed for a test of the remaining hypotheses related to how emotion 
influences exchange behaviors across relationship types. 
Take-Some Condition Results 
 The results of the tests for main effects and interactions for token allocation 
within the take-some condition are presented in Table 5. There was a significant main 
effect for both emotion induction (F (1, 45) = 3.66, p < .05) and relationship type (F (2, 
135) = 16.60, p < .001). The main effect of relationship type fits with the expectation that 
participants would take tokens differently across relationship partners. Contrary to 
expectations, there was not a significant interaction between the two independent 
variables on tokens taken.  
Table 5 
Study 2 - F-Ratios for Main Effects and Interactions across Emotion Induction by 
Relationship Type Conditions within Take-Some Game Type 
   
  Tokens Taken 
   
 Emotion Induction F (1, 45)         3.66* 
 Relationship Type F (2, 135)         16.60*** 
 Emotion Induction x Relationship Type F (6, 135)         1.73 
   
   
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
 To test the notion that participants would take more tokens from non-kin 
compared to kin (i.e., hypothesis 2b), a planned comparison was conducted on the 
combined tokens taken from strangers and friends (i.e., non-kin partners) compared to 
cousins and siblings (i.e., kin partners). This comparison was significant (p < .001), with 
the more tokens taken from non-kin (M = 11.57, SD = 6.91) than from kin (M = 8.20, SD 
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= 5.46). It should be noted that this difference appears to be primarily due to the higher 
number of tokens take from strangers (M = 13.38, SD = 6.31). The means for the other 
levels of relationship type were: friends (M = 9.31, SD = 6.80), cousins (M = 9.08, SD = 
5.23), and siblings (M = 7.31, SD = 5.59).   
 A comparison of tokens taken across levels of emotion induction was conducted 
based on the significant main effect of emotion induction. Participants took significantly 
more tokens (p < .05) in the anger condition (M = 11.31, SD = 6.02) compared to 
participants in the gratitude condition (M = 7.64, SD = 6.74). There were no differences 
between tokens taken in the control condition (M = 10.69, SD = 6.00) with either the 
anger or gratitude condition. The cell means and standard deviations of token allocation 
across levels of emotion induction and relationship type within the take-some condition 
are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Study 2 - Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Take-Some Token Allocation across 
Emotion Induction and Relationship Type Conditions 
    
 Anger Gratitude Control 
    
 Stranger 16.93 (3.57) 11.25 (7.42) 13.31 (6.27) 
 Friend 12.00 (7.92)   6.57 (5.76)   9.38 (5.75) 
 Cousin   9.56 (2.28)   6.88 (6.57) 10.81 (5.36) 
 Sibling   6.81 (3.49)   5.88 (6.35)   9.25 (6.23) 
    
 
 Despite the lack of an interaction, planned comparisons of mean tokens taken 
across levels of emotion induction within levels of relationship partners were conducted. 
The pattern of means for token allocation within the take-some condition is presented 
graphically in Figure 5.  
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 Although not in the expected manner, the emotion induction task did impact the 
token allocation decisions of strangers and friends, but not cousins and siblings. 
Specifically, participants took more tokens from the stranger after completing the anger 
induction compared to when they completed the gratitude induction (p < .05). The same 
pattern emerged for friends, with participants taking more from friends after the anger 
induction compared to after the gratitude induction (p < .05). There were no significant 
differences across levels of emotion induction within the cousin or sibling conditions. In 
order to provide better evidence for hypothesis 2c, ideally the number of tokens taken 
after the anger and gratitude induction for non-kin partners would have each significantly 
differed from the control condition rather than from each other. Nevertheless, the general 
pattern fits with the expectation that anger and gratitude impact exchange decisions 
differently across non-kin versus kin relationship partners, and thus provides partial 
support for hypothesis 2c.   
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Figure 5 - Study 2 Means for Tokens Taken in the Take-Some Condition Across Emotion 
Induction and Relationship Type 
 
Expected Partner Reaction Results  
 To provide a sense of the interrelation between the main dependent variable 
(tokens taken) and the follow-up items, partial correlations are presented in Table 7. 
These correlations are presented with the effects of the emotion induction and 
relationship type removed. The number of tokens taken was positively associated with 
the level of anger expected from a relationship partner and negatively associated with 
level of expected partner gratitude. How fair the token allocation was expected to be 
assessed by the partner was negatively correlated with the number of tokens taken.  
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Table 7. 
Study 2 - Partial correlations among tokens and follow-up measures controlling for the 
experimental conditions of emotion induction and relationship type 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
     
1. Tokens Taken -    
2. Expected Anger   .54*** -   
3. Expected Gratitude  -.52***  -.46*** -  
4. Fairness of Offer  -.56***  -.63***  .60*** - 
     
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 A separate set of mixed-model ANOVAs were run for the three exploratory 
follow-up items. Results from these models are presented in Table 8. Of the three items, 
only expected anger had a significant interaction (F (6, 135) = 3.16, p < .01).  
 
Table 8 
Study 2 - F-Ratios for Main Effects and Interactions across Emotion Induction by 
Relationship Type Conditions within Take-Some Game Type 
     
   Expected 
Anger 
Expected 
Gratitude 
Fair Offer 
     
 Emotion Induction F (1, 45) 9.78*** 6.02** 1.69 
 Relationship Type F (2, 135) 11.03*** 16.01*** 11.61*** 
 Emotion Induction x 
Relationship Type 
F (6, 135) 3.16** 1.86 1.13 
     
     
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
 The pattern of means across experimental conditions for these follow-up items are 
presented in Table 9. Given the correlations between these follow-up items and the 
number of tokens taken, it is not surprising that the means across experimental conditions 
generally conform to the pattern found in the main analysis. This is especially the case for 
expected anger.  
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Table 9 
Study 2 - Means for Follow-up items across Emotion Induction by Relationship Type 
Conditions within Take-Some Game Type 
    
 Expected 
Anger 
Expected 
Gratitude 
Fair Offer 
    
Stranger    
     Anger 5.56 (1.67) 2.13 (1.20) 3.06 (1.61) 
     Gratitude 2.12 (1.78) 2.75 (2.32) 3.75 (1.91) 
     Control 3.43 (2.50) 2.75 (1.69) 3.63 (2.75) 
    
Friend    
     Anger 3.81 (2.43) 3.50 (1.83) 4.50 (1.97) 
     Gratitude 1.31 (0.79) 5.44 (1.31) 5.44 (1.15) 
     Control 2.56 (1.96) 3.44 (2.16) 4.38 (2.42) 
    
Cousin    
     Anger 3.44 (1.46) 3.25 (1.44) 4.06 (1.29) 
     Gratitude 2.00 (1.71) 4.81 (1.72) 5.19 (1.72) 
     Control 2.75 (1.91) 3.31 (1.49) 4.31 (2.18) 
    
Sibling    
     Anger 2.31 (1.30) 4.38 (2.13) 5.19 (1.11) 
     Gratitude 1.44 (1.03) 5.38 (1.45) 5.56 (1.15) 
     Control 2.56 (2.16) 3.63 (1.86) 4.25 (2.24) 
    
    
    
 
 The pattern of means for expected anger mirror the means for tokens taken and 
are presented graphically in Figure 6. Participants expected strangers to respond to their 
token allocation with significantly more anger compared to friends (p < .001), cousins (p 
< .01), and siblings (p < .001). Similar to the pattern of findings for the tokens taken 
variable, participants in the anger induction condition expected significantly more anger 
from strangers compared to individuals in the gratitude (p < .001) and control (p < .01) 
conditions; and more anger from friends compared to individuals in the gratitude 
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condition (p < .001). There were no significant differences in expected anger across 
emotion conditions for cousins and siblings. 
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 Figure 6 - Study 2 Means for Expected Anger in the Take-Some Dilemma Across 
Emotion Induction and Relationship Type 
 
 There was an interesting and unexpected pattern that emerged for expected 
partner gratitude. The means for the expected gratitude outcomes are presented 
graphically in Figure 7. In general, participants expected that strangers would feel less 
gratitude when they were told about the token allocation compared to friends (p < .001), 
cousins (p < .001), and siblings (p < .001). Participants in the gratitude induction 
condition reported that their friends would feel significantly more gratitude compared to 
individuals in the anger induction condition (p < .01) and the control condition (p < .01). 
This was also the case for expected gratitude from cousins, with individuals in the 
gratitude condition expecting more gratitude from cousins compared to individuals in the 
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anger condition (p < .05) and the control condition (p < .05). Finally, individuals in the 
gratitude induction condition reported expecting that their siblings would feel more 
gratitude compared to individuals in the control condition (p < .05). Recall that there 
were no differences in token allocation across emotion conditions for kin relationship 
partners. As such, it appears that participants projected their own felt gratitude from the 
emotion induction task onto the cousins and siblings without necessarily taking less 
tokens from them compared to participants in the anger and control conditions. 
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Figure 7 - Study 2 Means for Expected Gratitude in the Take-Some Dilemma Across 
Emotion Induction and Relationship Type 
 
Give-Some Results 
 The results from the tests for main effects and interactions for token allocation 
within the give-some condition are presented in Table 10. There was a significant main 
effect for both emotion induction (F (1, 45) = 3.27, p < .05) and relationship type (F (2, 
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135) = 10.59, p < .001) on the number of tokens given. These main effects were qualified 
by a significant interaction (F (6, 135) = 2.75, p < .05). The significant main effect of 
relationship type and the significant relationship type by emotion induction interaction fit 
with the expectations of hypotheses 2d and 2e, and justified examining the pattern of cell 
means. 
Table 10 
Study 2 - F-Ratios for Main Effects and Interactions across Emotion Induction by 
Relationship Type Conditions within Give-Some Game Type 
   
  Tokens Taken 
   
 Emotion Induction F (1, 45)         3.27* 
 Relationship Type F (2, 135)         10.59*** 
 Emotion Induction x Relationship Type F (6, 135)         2.75* 
   
   
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
 The means for tokens given across the experimental conditions are presented in 
Table 11. To test the prediction that participants would give more tokens to kin compared 
to non-kin partners (i.e., hypothesis 2d), a contrast was conducted comparing tokens 
allocated to cousins and siblings with tokens allocated to strangers and friends. Based on 
this comparison, there was not evidence to support hypothesis 2d. In other words, there 
was not a significant difference between the number of tokens given across these groups. 
Comparing the individual means across all four levels of relationship type, however, did 
show some significant differences. Specifically, strangers (M = 6.21, SD = 6.44) were 
given significantly less (p < .001) than both friends (M = 10.85, SD = 5.55) and siblings 
(M = 10.65, SD = 5.84). In addition, cousins (M = 7.39, SD = 5.56) were given less than 
friends (p < .01) and siblings (p < .01). Despite the main effect of emotion induction, 
there were no significant differences in tokens given across levels of emotion induction 
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(anger M = 7.73, SD = 5.05; gratitude M = 10.67, SD = 7.26; control M = 7.92, SD = 
5.58). 
Table 11 
Study 2 - Cell Means and Standard Deviation for Give-Some Token Allocation across 
Emotion Induction and Relationship Type Conditions 
    
 Anger Gratitude Control 
    
 Stranger   3.38 (3.85) 10.43 (8.63)   4.81 (3.37) 
 Friend   8.81 (3.54) 14.37 (6.22)   9.38 (5.03) 
 Cousin   7.88 (4.70)   7.31 (6.59)   7.00 (5.56) 
 Sibling 10.88 (5.07) 10.56 (6.19) 10.50 (6.54) 
    
 
 An interesting pattern emerges when examining token allocation across the levels 
of emotion induction within relationship types. The means are plotted graphically in 
Figure 8. As predicted in hypothesis 2e, there were differences in how the emotion 
induction condition impacted token allocation within relationship types. Contrary to 
expectations, the anger manipulation did not lead to significant differences in how many 
tokens were given to relationship partners, with the anger condition showing no 
difference from the control condition within all four levels of relationship type. In 
contrast, the gratitude manipulation did appear to impact token allocation, but only for 
non-kin partners (i.e., strangers and friends). More specifically, individuals in the 
gratitude induction condition gave more to strangers compared with those in both the 
anger condition (p < .01) and those in the control condition (p < .05). The same pattern 
was found for tokens given to friends, with individuals in the gratitude condition giving 
more tokens to friends compared to those in the anger condition (p < .05) and the control 
condition (p < .05). There were no significant differences across the emotion induction 
conditions within cousins or siblings. This pattern of results provides partial support for 
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hypothesis 2e, with gratitude (but not anger) leading to differences in token allocation for 
non-kin. 
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Figure 8 - Study 2 Means for Tokens Given in the Give-Some Dilemma Across Emotion 
Induction and Relationship Type 
 
Expected Partner Reaction Results  
 To provide a sense of the interrelation between the main dependent variable 
(tokens given) and the follow-up items, partial correlations are presented in Table 12. 
These correlations are presented with the effects of the emotion induction and 
relationship type removed. The number of tokens given was negatively associated with 
the level of anger expected from a relationship partner and positively associated with 
level of expected partner gratitude. How fair the token allocation was expected to be 
assessed by the partner was positively correlated with the number of tokens given.  
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Table 12. 
Study 2 - Partial correlations between tokens and follow-up measures controlling for 
experimental conditions of emotion induction and relationship type 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
     
1. Tokens Given -    
2. Expected Anger   -.42*** -   
3. Expected Gratitude    .59***  -.42*** -  
4. Fairness of Offer    .35***  -.51***  .66*** - 
     
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 A separate set of mixed-model ANOVAs were run for the three exploratory 
follow-up items. Results from these models are presented in Table 13. All three follow-
up measures had significant emotion induction by relationship type interactions. These 
interactions justified examining the pattern of cell means across the experimental 
conditions.  
Table 13 
Study 2 - F-Ratios for Main Effects and Interactions across Emotion Induction by 
Relationship Type Conditions within Give-Some Game Type 
     
   Expected 
Anger 
Expected 
Gratitude 
Fair Offer 
     
 Emotion Induction F (1, 45) 1.16 0.52 0.04 
 Relationship Type F (2, 135) 5.59*** 10.99*** 8.18*** 
 Emotion Induction x         
Relationship Type 
F (6, 135) 4.49*** 2.18* 3.06** 
     
     
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
 Cell means for the follow-up items across the levels of emotion induction and 
relationship type are presented in Table 14. Overall, the means from these follow-up 
items did not provide as clear a pattern as the follow-up items from the take-some 
condition. There were, however, a few noteworthy mean differences. For example, 
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participants generally expected more anger from strangers after they learned about the 
token allocation compared to friends (p < .01). Contrary to the idea that emotions play a 
more important role for non-kin interaction compared to kin interaction during exchange 
situations, participants expected less anger from friends compared to cousins (p < .01). 
 Participants in the anger induction condition reported that they expected strangers 
to feel more anger upon hearing about the number of tokens given compared to both 
individuals in the gratitude condition (p < .01) and the control condition (p < .01). 
Unexpectedly, there was also a significant difference between how the individuals in the 
anger induction condition expected their siblings to react to their token allocation, with 
individuals in the anger condition expecting siblings to react with significantly less anger 
than individuals in the gratitude condition (p < .05).  
 For the expected gratitude variable, participants expected less gratitude from 
strangers compared to friends (p < .001) and siblings (p < .001). Similarly to how 
individuals in the anger induction condition expected more anger from strangers, 
participants in the gratitude induction condition expected strangers to feel more gratitude 
upon learning of the token allocation compared to participants in the anger induction 
condition (p < .05).  
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Table 14 
Study 2 - Means for Follow-up items across Emotion Induction by Relationship Type 
Conditions within Give-Some Game Type 
    
 Expected 
Anger 
Expected 
Gratitude 
Fair Offer 
    
Stranger    
     Anger 3.63 (2.09) 2.69 (1.70) 3.31 (1.92) 
     Gratitude 2.00 (1.32) 4.38 (2.50) 4.38 (1.63) 
     Control 2.06 (1.29) 3.19 (1.68) 4.82 (1.38) 
    
Friend    
     Anger 1.68 (1.25) 4.88 (1.50) 5.56 (1.50) 
     Gratitude 1.75 (1.00) 5.44 (1.59) 5.31 (1.49) 
     Control 1.56 (1.03) 4.88 (1.52) 5.69 (1.25) 
    
Cousin    
     Anger 2.31 (1.74) 4.13 (1.54) 4.56 (1.86) 
     Gratitude 3.19 (1.94) 3.75 (1.61) 4.31 (1.30) 
     Control 2.06 (1.39) 4.06 (2.17) 4.63 (1.86) 
    
Sibling    
     Anger 1.38 (0.62) 5.31 (1.54) 5.81 (1.42) 
     Gratitude 2.69 (1.96) 4.56 (1.82) 5.06 (1.65) 
     Control 1.88 (1.36) 4.31 (2.06) 4.31 (1.74) 
    
 
Discriminant Analyses 
 As in Study 1, another set of analyses were conducted to rule out the possibility 
that the differences in token allocation decisions were due to variables that have 
previously been shown to be related to kin altruism (e.g., Korchmaros & Kenny, 2001; 
2006; Kruger, 2003).  Means and standard deviations for relationship partner information 
variables used in these discriminant analyses are presented in Table 15.  
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Table 15 
Study 2 - Means and Standard Deviations for Relationship Partner Measures (Entire 
Sample) 
     
 Partner Age Emotional 
Closeness 
IOS Felt 
Similarity 
     
 Friend 25.42 (9.38) 5.63 (1.15) 5.45 (1.33) 5.20 (1.14) 
 Cousin 25.21 (8.37) 4.21 (1.47) 3.75 (1.65) 3.99 (1.60) 
 Sibling 24.63 (8.70) 5.90 (1.26) 5.53 (1.40) 5.10 (1.55) 
     
 
 Two models were run for each of these relationship partner measures: one for the 
take-some condition and one for the give-some condition. In other words, the same 
models from the main analysis with token allocation as the outcome variable were re-run 
with a relationship partner covariate. It should be noted that these models differed from 
the models from the main analysis in that the stranger level of the relationship partner 
factor was removed. This was done because the relationship partner measures were not 
applicable to a stranger.  
 Overall, the main effects, interactions, and patterns of cell means were not altered 
by including any of the relationship partner measures as covariates. There were main 
effects of emotional closeness (for both the take-some and give-some condition) and felt 
similarity (for take-some only), but the including these variables in the analysis did not 
impact the pattern of token allocation across the emotion induction and relationship 
partner conditions. No main effects of were found for age of the relationship partner or 
the inclusion of other in self measure.  
 Finally, participant sex was added to the models to test for differences between 
men and women on token allocation. There were no significant main effects or 
57 
 
 
interactions involving participant sex on token allocation in either the take-some or give-
some conditions. As was the case in Study 1, there were no sex differences in Study 2.   
Discussion 
 Study 2 found mixed support for its main hypotheses, but when viewed in sum, 
did provide some evidence for the general prediction that emotional experience and 
relationship type impact exchange behaviors. The significant 3-way interaction between 
game type, emotion induction, and relationship type justified further analyzing how 
emotion and relationship type influenced token allocation within the two levels of game 
type.  
 Participants allocated tokens differently across levels of relationship type, but not 
exactly in the manner predicted by hypotheses 2b and 2d. These hypotheses predicted 
that there would be significant differences between how tokens were allocated between 
kin (i.e., cousins and siblings) and non-kin (i.e., strangers and friends). There was a 
significant difference in token allocation between kin and non-kin in the take-some 
condition, but not in the give-some condition. In general, there was a more pronounced 
difference between token allocation to strangers compared to the other three levels of 
relationship type. Participants took more from, and gave less to, strangers compared to 
the other relationship partners. Friends, cousins, and siblings were allocated similar 
amounts of tokens across the two game types. 
 More importantly, there was also partial support for the prediction that feelings of 
anger and gratitude would influence token allocation differently for kin versus non-kin 
relationship partners (i.e., hypotheses 2c and 2e). In the take some game, participants in 
the anger condition took more tokens from strangers and friends compared to individuals 
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in the gratitude conditions. No differences were found for how emotion influenced tokens 
taken for cousins and friends. The boost in tokens taken from non-kin in the anger 
condition fits with the notion that emotion influences non-kin social exchange differently 
than kin exchange. From a functional perspective, angry individuals taking more tokens 
can be viewed as being linked to anger's role in influencing punishment behaviors. The 
functional link between feelings of anger and behaving in ways that signal a desire to 
punish inequity or even dissolve an exchange relationship seems more relevant for non-
kin exchange. As predicted, these punitive decisions were only made for non-kin 
relationship partners, where the absence of inclusive fitness effects requires more rigid 
policing of social exchange.  
 The structure of the give some game allows individuals to use their endowment of 
tokens to benefit their partner. Based on the social functional role of gratitude (e.g., 
fostering prosocial behavior; McCollough, et al., 2001), it stands to reason that inducing 
feelings of gratitude within the context of the give some dilemma may lead to more 
generous token allocation. This was the case, but only for non-kin relationship partners. 
This finding provides further evidence for Study 2's prediction that emotional experience 
impacts exchange behaviors differently across kin and non-kin. Placing gratitude within a 
functional framework means looking at the likely cognitive and behavioral outcomes 
associated with its activation. Thinking and acting prosocially can be seen as especially 
advantageous in response to altruistic behavior from novel individuals. An altruistic 
stranger or acquaintance is someone who is providing an opportunity to forge a mutually 
beneficial social bond. The link between the feelings of gratitude engendered from this 
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situation and the higher likelihood of reciprocating the altruism can be seen as functional 
for forming new relationships but is not necessarily as important for kin interaction.  
 The follow-up items measured expected partner responses and showed that 
participants generally expected strangers to respond with anger when they learned about 
their token allocation. This was especially true for participants who completed the anger 
induction. These individuals allocated less tokens to strangers and also expected the 
strangers respond to their allocation with anger. Expected gratitude exhibited a different 
pattern, especially in the take some game. Participants who completed the gratitude 
induction appeared to project their own felt gratitude onto their friends, cousins, and 
siblings--despite the fact that they did not take any more tokens from them compared to 
participants in the other emotion induction conditions.  
 The main goal of Study 2 was to test the idea that anger and gratitude are part of a 
psychological system that functions to regulate reciprocal altruism between non-kin 
exchange partners, but may not as strongly influence exchange among kin. The general 
pattern of results does lend some support to this notion, with token allocation varying 
across emotion induction within the stranger and friend conditions, but not within the 
cousin and sibling conditions. This finding builds on the results from Study 1, where 
evidence illustrating more intense emotional responses to inequitable exchange for non-
kin was garnered. The follow-up items from Study 2 measured participant's expectations 
for how their relationship partners would emotionally respond to their offers and thus 
provides a link between these studies. Similar to how participants responded with more 
anger after smaller offers from non-kin in Study 1, participants in Study 2 expected 
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strangers and friends to respond to smaller token allocations with anger. This link shows 
how anger may fit into non-kin exchange from a dyadic perspective.  
General Discussion 
 Taken together, the current studies represent a step toward an empirical mapping 
of a psychological system designed to regulate exchange with non-kin. This research was 
focused on examining the functional role of anger and gratitude in exchange situations. It 
was predicted that these emotions act as proximal mechanisms that guide thoughts and 
behaviors based on assessments of costs and benefits. Because costs and benefits in 
exchange situations can be understood to vary across kin and non-kin relationships based 
on the presence or absence of inclusive fitness effects, these emotions were expected to 
differ in their intensity and behavioral outcomes during interactions with non-kin 
compared to with kin.  
 Study 1 found that the intensity of emotional response to hypothetical offers in an 
ultimatum game situation varies according to the degree of partner relatedness, with 
offers from strangers generally leading to the highest levels of gratitude and anger, 
followed by friends, cousins, then siblings. This finding fits with predictions derived 
from the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and illustrates how 
relationship type can act as a situational factor that differentially influences emotional 
activation. Considering these results from a functional approach leads to some interesting 
implications. Recall that the functional approach to emotions attempts to define emotions 
in terms of how they enable effective responses to situational challenges and 
opportunities (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner, et al., 2006; 
Levenson, 1999). This approach fits well with the evolutionary perspectives like 
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inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism. If it is the case that interacting with non-kin 
exchange partners requires a more careful consideration of equity (i.e., assessments of 
reciprocity/relative costs and benefits), then not only would emotions like anger and 
gratitude be more likely to be activated with non-kin, they may also be more likely to 
guide exchange behaviors in a manner that would have been adaptive in our evolutionary 
environment. Study 2 helped address this question by examining exchange behaviors 
within the contexts of emotional activation and relationship type.  
 Study 2 built on Study 1's findings by extending the research question to whether 
a given level of anger or gratitude would lead to different decisions within an exchange 
situation across levels of relationship type. In other words, once triggered, do anger and 
gratitude influence decisions differently for strangers and friends compared to with 
cousins and siblings? This extension gave the current research the potential to make a 
clearer functional case for anger and gratitude in the context of non-kin exchange.  
 The presence of inclusive fitness effects for kin relationship partners means that 
the flow of costs and benefits within the relationship may be assessed differently based 
on costs being mitigated by mutual shared benefit from a genetic perspective. In contrast, 
exchange interaction with non-kin requires more stringent policing of equity and 
reciprocity, at least according to the evolutionary account of reciprocal altruism theory 
(Trivers, 1971). Based on predictions derived from this distinction, Study 2 found that 
anger led individuals to more punitive behaviors toward non-kin compared to kin. 
Similarly, gratitude was linked to more generous exchange decisions for non-kin 
exchange partners, but not for kin partners. In other words, for strangers and friends there 
were stronger links between anger and taking more to the self, and gratitude and giving 
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more to the partner. This pattern fits well with a function account for anger and gratitude 
within Trivers' (1971) psychological system regulating non-kin exchange.  
  Within an evolutionary account of emotions, anger and gratitude are viewed as 
mechanisms that organize and coordinate thoughts and behaviors based on context 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; 2005; 2008). In the current research the contextual factor of 
kinship led to more anger after unfair offers from non-kin; and more gratitude after fair 
and generous offers from non-kin. Importantly, once triggered, anger and gratitude led to 
the same sort of exchange behaviors toward non-kin partners in Study 2 as the patterns of 
hypothetical behaviors that led to their activation in Study 1. This link provides insight 
into the functional roles anger and gratitude play in regulating non-kin exchange.  
 In our environment of evolutionary adaptedness, inequity or a lack of reciprocal 
exchange with a non-related individual would have had negative consequences in terms 
of survival and fitness outcomes. Anger and its associated cognitive and behavioral 
consequences (e.g., aggression, punishment; Berkowitz, 1990) have been speculated to 
represent a evolved functional response to these situations (Nesse, 1990; Trivers, 1971). 
Similarly, acts of reciprocity and generosity from a non-kin individual would have had 
positive fitness outcomes in our ancestral environments. Gratitude and its associated 
cognitive and behavioral outcomes (e.g., altruistic, prosocial behavior; McCollough, et 
al., 2001) have been proposed to represent an adaptive response to these situations. The 
current research represents the first direct empirical tests of these notions.  
  Although far from definitive, the pattern of findings from the current experiments 
does lend preliminary empirical support for some of the tenets Trivers' (1971) reciprocal 
altruism theory. Specifically, at least in exchange situations, anger and gratitude appear to 
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operate differently to regulate decision-making related to altruistic behavior for non-kin 
relationships compared to kin relationships. This is an interesting and important 
contribution in several respects. 
 First, this research represents an empirical contribution to the evolutionary 
psychological literature in that it provides further evidence in support of both inclusive 
fitness theory and reciprocal altruism theory. Non-kin altruism remains a topic of debate 
in the animal literature, where there is ongoing discussion about the frequency, nature, 
and evolutionary origin of cooperative social behavior between non-kin animals. For 
example, population simulations with assumptions regarding internal states analogous to 
anger/punishment and gratitude/reciprocity have been shown to be a condition in which 
generalized reciprocity can evolve in animal species without complex cognitive systems 
(Barta, McNamara, Huszar, & Taborsky, 2011). This sort of generalized reciprocity (i.e., 
indiscriminant cooperation outside the context of a relationship) within a large population 
does not fit with some of the assumptions Trivers (1971) originally required for his 
theory (e.g., repeated interaction with the same individual). Other ideas that challenge 
Trivers' original theory relate to asymmetries in the ability for an organism to provide 
benefits to others (Dawkins, 2009), and the roles coercion and manipulation across 
dominance hierarchies may play on the costs and benefits involved in non-kin altruism 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Cant & Johnstone, 2006). One thing that animal 
researchers do agree on is that the vast majority of animal cooperation occurs among kin 
(Clutton-Brock, 2009). In contrast, non-kin cooperation is pervasive among humans, at 
least in modern society. The current research adds to the understanding of mechanisms 
involved in the human capacity for non-kin cooperation. Whereas cooperation and 
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altruism in general have received empirical attention (e.g., Batson, et al, 1997; Cialdini, 
et al., 1997), these topics in the context of kinship and evolutionary psychology require 
further study.  
 The current research also contributes to the psychology of kin relationships. 
Especially during the formative years of childhood, humans spend the majority of their 
time with kin. Moreover, the relative amount of time spent with kin during our ancestral 
past was likely much higher than it is currently. As such, introducing relationship type as 
a contextual factor that may impact psychological processes seems like an important area 
of research. Nevertheless, empirical research on kin relations remains understudied 
within social psychology (Daly, et al., 1997; Salmon & Shackelford, 2011).  
 The current research was interested in how emotions and kinship interact in 
exchange situations and found that anger and gratitude have different outcomes for non-
kin versus kin relationship partners. Structured situations from economic decision-
making frameworks are ideal for studying this sort of research question, but this is just 
one of many social contexts (Kelley, et al., 2003). Emotions are likely to have different 
profiles of activation and behavioral outcomes in other contexts. For example, conflicts 
between parents and children stem from strictly kin-based interactions and likely have 
interesting patterns of emotion and strategic decision-making (Trivers, 1974). In the 
current research, friends exhibited especially interesting patterns of results. In one sense, 
they were treated like kin (e.g., general token allocations similar to cousins and siblings), 
but like strangers were more susceptible to anger and gratitude affecting token 
allocations. More precisely defining the similarities and differences between friendship 
and kinship is another potential area for further study. Despite having distinct 
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evolutionary origins stemming from reciprocal altruism and kin selection respectively, 
social interaction with friends and kin may trigger kin-based psychological mechanisms 
when friends share relatively large amounts of fitness interdependence (Brown & Brown, 
2006). Moreover, there is evidence that suggests that distinguishing kin and non-kin can 
be a fallible process, with inferences of kinship being triggered by attitude similarity and 
superficial facial similarity (DeBruine, 2005; Park & Schaller, 2005). Future research 
would be well served by attending to the heuristics humans use to identify kin and 
friends, as the presence of some situational cues may trigger responses designed for kin 
interaction during interaction with non-kin (Park, Schaller, & Van Vugt, 2008).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although the current research did lead to some interesting findings, there are 
several limitations to this research. These limitations relate primarily to methodological 
and conceptual issues. Like any single set of studies, this research represents a relatively 
small piece of a larger program of research that is required before making more definitive 
conclusions regarding the evolutionary origin and function of proximal psychological 
mechanisms like anger and gratitude. 
 One major limitation of the current research was the use of hypothetical stimuli in 
the structured exchange situations. Although Study 2 included the cover story regarding 
the token allocation results being emailed to partners in an attempt to add psychological 
realism, there is the possibility that findings using actual face-to-face exchange situations 
would diverge from the current results. There is also the possibility that how participants 
reported they would feel in response to the hypothetical offers in Study 1 would be 
different from how they would actually feel during a real exchange situation. Future 
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research could attempt to replicate these findings with varied samples and settings. For 
example, achieving the same pattern of findings by bringing dyads with different 
relationships types (e.g., strangers, friends, siblings, etc) into a laboratory to take part in 
economic games for actual money would serve to address the potential issue of a lack of 
psychological realism. Moreover, using actual dyads would allow for more complicated 
research questions to be tested, such as the communicative role of emotions during 
exchange, and how emotional expression affects subsequent transactions in a real-time 
economic game. Study 2 manipulated emotion in general without reference to the 
exchange partner, which had advantages from a methodological perspective (e.g., 
allowed relationship type to be a within-subjects variable). Future research could modify 
the emotion manipulation such that participants would enter a state of anger or gratitude 
based on the unfair or prosocial behaviors of a particular relationship partner. Based on 
the current results, it could be predicted that there would be differences in decision-
making and behavior for individuals who are experiencing social emotions as a result of a 
stranger's behavior compared to with kin. Similarly, interacting with non-kin individuals 
who are expressing anger and gratitude may lead to different outcomes compared to 
emotion expressing kin. The shift from emotion states triggered by unrelated events to 
emotions resulting from interpersonal behaviors could lead to a stronger set of results 
compared to the results from Study 2. As such, future research employing this change 
would serve to both replicate the current findings and could also strengthen the pattern of 
evidence that provided partial support for Study 2's hypotheses. Finally, another potential 
avenue for future research would be to track the emotional experiences of dyad members 
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over time using daily diaries to get a sense of the frequency and intensity of emotions 
within different types of relationships. 
 Another methodological limitation from the current research relates to the ability 
to generalize the findings from the experimental factors beyond the levels that were 
selected in the designs. In other words, this research was only concerned with four 
relationship types: strangers, friends, cousins, and siblings. These types were sufficient 
for testing the current hypotheses, but there are plenty of interesting combinations that 
could be the topic of future research. For kin, parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, and 
aunt/uncle-niece/nephew relationships remain unexplored in the context of emotions and 
social exchange. There are also plenty of non-kin relationships that may be of interest for 
future research. For example, co-worker relationships have attributes that fit well with 
idea of reciprocal altruism and thus may be of use for future research. There are also 
plenty of instances of power differences in workplace relationships that may be linked 
with interesting patterns of emotions and exchange behavior. Finally, the current research 
treated relationship type as a within-subjects variable, which have several advantages 
from a design and statistics perspective, but also can be susceptible to contrast effects. 
Future research could attempt to replicate the current results by treating relationship type 
as a between-subjects variable to rule out the possibility that there were contrast effects in 
the current research. 
 In an attempt to reduce the impact of sex differences in altruism (e.g., Burnstein et 
al., 1994), the current research used only same-sex relationships. Using relationships with 
both men and women is also an area that requires further study in this domain. One topic 
that may yield particularly interesting results would be testing the role of emotions on 
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regulating exchange within romantic relationships. Especially for couples with children, 
romantic relationships can be conceptualized as a relationship type with a blend of non-
kin and kin attributes. Members of romantic dyads with children are not genetically 
related, but do share a significant degree of fitness-related outcomes in the form of 
offspring. The high degree of relatedness between each parent and each child (r = 0.5) 
could be a cue that leads to thoughts and behaviors within romantic relationships that 
result in outcomes more closely associated with kin interaction. This may be especially 
true based on situational factors such as the age and health of the children (Burnstein, et 
al., 1994), with kinship processes among parents being more pronounced during 
situations in which cooperation is necessary in order to ameliorate threats to inclusive 
fitness. Future research could, for example, attempt to trigger various goals states in a 
sample of couples with children to see if there are patterns of prosocial and helping 
behaviors that are uniquely triggered by a motivation to facilitate the success of children 
compared to other domains that require cooperation (e.g., dividing household chores). 
Finding evidence for more cooperative behavior in the presence of cues more closely 
linked to inclusive fitness would help empirically bolster the idea that romantic partners 
with children represent a case where kin and non-kin psychological processes are both 
operating depending on domain.  
 Anger and gratitude are just two of the mechanisms proposed by Trivers (1971) as 
being important in regulating non-kin reciprocal altruism. As such, the current research 
only provides a first step toward a more thorough understanding of the psychological 
system operating on reciprocal altruism. Future research could target other social 
emotions like guilt. Guilt is commonly defined as a feeling that is experienced after 
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transgressing against a moral imperative (Lazarus, 1991). This concept fits well into a 
framework of equity regulation, and examining guilt across relationship types may 
provide evidence for it being another proximal mechanism with characteristic differences 
across contexts like kinship. In addition to emotions, future research could also examine 
how higher-order constructs like trust fit into the reciprocal altruism system.  
 Another of the current research's limitation is that it cannot, on its own, rule out 
all plausible alternative explanations for the findings. The present research tested 
hypotheses derived from evolutionary theories that predict that anger and gratitude 
function, as a result of reciprocal altruism selection, to regulate thoughts and behaviors in 
exchange situations differently for non-kin compared to kin. Although variables like 
partner's age, emotional closeness, and felt similarity were included as controls and did 
not impact the results, there are other explanations that require future research to 
definitively rule out. For example, rather than kinship, it could be that a general sense of 
familiarity with an exchange partner would better explain the results. The frequency with 
which one interacts with a relationship partner may also be an important factor. There has 
been a distinction made between so-called communal and exchange relationships based 
on whether or not strict tit-for-tat reciprocity is a relationship norm (Clark, Mills, & 
Powell, 1986). Instead of being based on kinship and inclusive fitness effects, the current 
results could be due to how individuals classify their relationships based on reciprocity 
norms. In other words, it may be that anger's and gratitude's role in non-kin exchange, 
rather than being adaptations with an evolutionary origin, are triggered as a result of more 
general learning processes.  
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 Results from social psychological research guided by evolutionary theory require 
an additional layer of inference compared to research testing more immediate proximal 
processes that are less concerned with historical causes (Conway & Schaller, 2002). It 
would have been less complicated to have removed reference to evolutionary origin and 
selection processes from the current hypotheses and instead focused on predictions such 
as: "anger will be more intense after unfair offers from strangers and friends because 
people are more likely to have had negative dealings with these groups compared to 
family and have thus learned to feel anger as a protective mechanism". This type of 
research question is more common in social psychology research and is part of what has 
been called the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). The 
SSSM eschews the idea that humans have evolutionary adaptations in the form of domain 
specific psychological mechanisms and instead explains social behavior with domain 
general processes such as learning. This approach has some merit (e.g., parsimony), but 
places human social psychology outside of the broader framework of the rest of the 
natural sciences. Evolutionary psychology has great potential for bridging the gap 
between psychology and other disciplines like biology, and thus may be worth the added 
complexity of making assumptions about selection pressures from distant ancestral 
environments. Any social behavior is undoubtedly multiply determined, but systematic 
and multi-method programs of research do allow for researchers to better parse the causes 
of psychological phenomenon into proximal and distal categories (Andrews, Gangestad, 
& Matthews, 2002; Simpson & Campbell, 2005). 
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